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Abstract—Physical layer security (PLS) technologies have at-
tracted much attention in recent years for their potential to
provide information-theoretically secure communications. Arti-
ficial Noise (AN)-aided transmission is considered as one of
the most practicable PLS technologies, as it can realize secure
transmission independent of the eavesdropper’s channel status.
In this paper, we reveal that AN transmission has the dependency
of eavesdropper’s channel condition by introducing our proposed
attack method based on a supervised-learning algorithm which
utilizes the modulation scheme, available from known packet
preamble and/or header information, as supervisory signals of
training data. Numerical simulation results with the comparison
to conventional clustering methods show that our proposed
method improves the success probability of attack from 4.8%
to at most 95.8% for the QPSK modulation. It implies that
the transmission to the receiver in the cell-edge with low order
modulation will be cracked if the eavesdropper’s channel is good
enough by employing more antennas than the transmitter. This
work brings new insights into the effectiveness of AN schemes and
provides useful guidance for the design of robust PLS techniques
for practical wireless systems.
Index Terms—Physical Layer Security; Artificial Noise; Ma-
chine Learning; Supervised-learning; Blind Estimation
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications are expected to expand into mis-
sion critical services such as connected vehicles and remote
medicine, which makes security one of most important con-
cerns in future wireless systems [1]. Wireless transmissions
have inherent security vulnerability due to their broadcast
nature, which makes passive eavesdropping and active attacks
much easier compared with their wired counterpart. Tradi-
tional cryptographic schemes protect the data by encryption,
but they may be cracked in the future by the emerging quantum
computing technologies [2]. On the other hand, Physical
Layer Security (PLS) technologies take a new direction by
exploiting the unpredictable characteristics of the wireless
channel, such as fading, to achieve information-theoretically
secure communication [3].
Artificial noise (AN)-aided transmission is considered as
one of the most practicable methods among numerous PLS
technologies [4], as it can realize a secure communication
without the eavesdropper (Eve)’s channel information and
independent of Eve’s channel status, e.g. signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR). The legitimate transmitter, Alice, equipped with multi-
antenna, firstly generates AN vectors based on the unique
channel impulse response between itself and the legitimate
receiver, Bob. Alice will then add the AN vectors, lying in the
null space of the Alice-Bob channel, to information vectors
for transmission, thus the AN vectors only interfere Eve. Since
the noise vector and information vector are both transmitted
from the same transmitter, Eve cannot improve its receiving
signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) even the wireless channel
between Alice and Eve is very good. Although some other PLS
technologies such as GSVD-based and ZF-based precoding
[5], [6] can also provide secure communication independent
of Eve’s SNR, their precoding requires Eve’s channel state
information which is usually not available in real systems.
Most existing AN work considers that Eve has less antennas
than Alice [7], [8], which is a too optimistic assumption and
difficult to be guaranteed. Therefore, how to ensure secure
communication when Eve has more antennas than Alice, is
essential for the practical realization of AN methods. As
pointed out in [9], when Eve has more antennas than Alice,
it can use the channel information between Alice to Bob and
Alice to Eve to cancel the noise vector completely and achieve
a higher capacity than Bob. It is thus necessary for Alice and
Bob to protect their channel information from Eve to ensure
secure communication under such condition.
Survival tests by many attack methods are necessary to
prove the robustness of security schemes [10]. Therefore,
attack methods that help Eve estimate the channel between
Alice and Bob for cracking AN-aided transmission, become
an essential criteria to evaluate AN scheme’ robustness for
its practical realization. Despite its importance, there is very
little work in this area. An attack method using indepen-
dent component analysis (ICA) has been proposed in [11].
However, ICA can only deal with one Gaussian distributed
source [12], thus may not work well to decode the AN signals
which include multiple Gaussian distributed noise sources.
Known plaintext attacks against PLS were proposed in [13]
and [14], whose performances highly depend on the amount
of available known plaintext. Since Alice will obviously not
transmit known wireless header information, e.g. preamble,
by using AN, which only benefit Eve by providing known
information with its cipher-text, it is difficult for the above
methods to work well in real system environments.
The work in [15] proposes an attack method which only uses
AN-aided symbols. This method treats AN-aided modulated
symbols as points distributed in different hyperplanes, and
decodes the desired information by adopting a clustering
algorithm to transform them back to the correct constellation
points. Although it does not need any additional information
such as the known plaintext, the clustering algorithm has
a high probability to converge to local optimal values due
to its dependency on the initial values, especially when the
modulation orders and number of antennas increase.
In this paper, we propose an efficient machine learning-
based attack method. The method firstly utilizes the informa-
tion of modulation scheme from an AN-aided packets’ known
symbols (preamble and/or header) to build the supervisory
signals of training data. A supervised learning-based algorithm
is then developed to search for the decode matrix, with which
the received AN-aided signals can be transformed to have the
smallest distance to the supervisory signals. Finally, an offline
phase shift operation is adopted to remove the effect of phase-
rotation thus the AN-aided signals can be recovered to those
received in Bob, which means AN method is cracked. Numer-
ical simulation results with the comparison to conventional
clustering methods in [15] show that our proposed method
improve the success probability of attack from 4.8% to at
most 95.8% for the QPSK modulation. This implies when Eve
adopts our attack method, AN transmission fails to keep its
independence to Eve’s channel status, and the transmission to
the receiver in the cell-edge with low order modulation will
be cracked if the Eve’s channel is good enough.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we give a brief description of AN transmissions and its
problems. We present the details of our proposed method in
Section III, and the simulation results with the comparison to
the conventional method are shown in Section IV. We conclude
the paper in Section V.
Notations: We denote conjugate, transpose, conjugate trans-
pose, Euclidean norm and trace operations by (·)∗, (·)T , (·)H ,
|| · ||, and Tr(·), respectively. Cm×n and Bm×n are the set of
m × n complex matrices and Boolean matrices, respectively.
CN (µ,D) denotes a complex Gaussian distribution with mean
µ and covariance D.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND OVERVIEW OF AN
A. Preliminary of AN
We consider a system including one transmitter Alice,
one legitimate receiver Bob, and one eavesdropper Eve, with
numbers of antennas NA, NB , and NE , respectively. As
shown in Fig. 1, H and G are the uncorrelated Rayleigh-
fading channels between Alice to Bob and Alice to Eve. Here,
H ∈ CNB×NA and G ∈ CNE×NA , and the elements of H and
G are i.i.d. complex random variables. AN schemes assume
NA > NB . Therefore, Alice can use its abundant antennas
to generate AN vectors. Alice first operates singular value
decomposition (SVD) of H as H = UΛV H , where V is an
unitary matrix and V ∈ CNA×NA , then derives subspaces for
information vector and artificial noise from V as
V = [V1, Z], (1)
Alice Bob
Eve
H
G I
Fig. 1. System model.
where the subspace of information vector V1 is the first NB
column of V , and Z is the subspace for the artificial noise.
Alice generates its transmission signal vector x as
x = V1u+ Zv, (2)
where u ∈ CNB×1 and v ∈ C(NA−NB)×1 are the information
and noise vector, respectively. The elements in u are chosen
from modulation constellation points with average power of
σ2u, and elements in v are Gaussian random variables with
variance σ2v . Because Z in (2) lies in the null space of H , the
received signal at Bob and Eve, z and y, can be given as
z = Hx+ nB = HV1u+HZv + nB = HV1u+ nB , (3)
y = Gx+ nE = GV1u+GZv + nE , (4)
respectively, where nB ∼ CN (0, σ2B) and nE ∼ CN (0, σ2E)
are the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at Bob and
Eve, respectively. The AN vector v only interferes Eve and
degrades its SIR. As the information vector and artificial noise
vector received at Eve experiences the same channel G, even
Eve has a better wireless channel to Alice compared to Bob, it
cannot achieve a higher capacity than an upper bound as shown
in [4]. As such, a secure communication can be guaranteed
when Alice transmits to Bob in a rate higher than Eve’s upper
bound capacity.
Power ratio (Pr) of the AN vector at Alice is an important
factor, which is defined as
Pr =
Pv
Pu + Pv
=
(NA −NB)σ2v
NBσ2u + (NA −NB)σ2v
, (5)
where Pu and Pv are power allocated to the information vector
and noise vector, respectively. Larger Pr at Alice results in
lower SIR at Eve but also causes lower SNR in Bob for
information signal. This results in a trade-off in security rate
as investigated in the literature [7], [8].
B. Attacks on AN in Practical Conditions
Most existing AN work assumes Eve has less antennas than
Alice (NA > NE). However, it is difficult to guarantee this
assumption in real systems, because Eve is likely to increase
its number of antennas to achieve a higher capacity. When Eve
equips more antennas and obtains the channel information of
G and H , it has the ability to cancel the artificial noise with
a decode matrix HG†, which can be given as
y′ = HG†y = HG†Gx+HG†nE = HV1u+HG†nE , (6)
where G† is the left inverse matrix of G which exists only
when NE ≥ NA. In this case, Eve can achieve a higher
capacity than Bob if it has better channel to Alice than Bob,
and as a result decode any transmission from Alice to Bob.
Therefore, in order to ensure secure communication, it
is necessary to prevent Eve from obtaining H and G. For
this purpose, Alice can require Bob to transmit pilot signals
and estimate the channel at the transmitter side. Because the
wireless channel between Alice and Bob is reciprocal and the
estimation offset between Alice and Bob can be emitted by
pre-adjustment, the estimated channel at Alice equals to H and
can be used to generate AN signals. Although Eve may also
receive the pilots from Bob, it can only estimate the channel
I between Bob to Eve, which is uncorrelated with H thus
useless at decoding AN signals with (6).
However, performance of AN scheme in above conditions
has not been well investigated. As mentioned in [10], survival
tests by possible attacks at Eve will be essential to prove AN
scheme’s robustness to encourage its practical realization. With
this motivation, we propose an efficient attack method and use
it to evaluate AN scheme’s security performance.
III. PROPOSED ATTACK METHOD
In this section, we present the details of the proposed attack
method against AN-aided transmissions. We firstly derive the
supervisory signals which are the outputs of training data,
from the information of modulation schemes available from
packet’s preamble and header. With these supervisory signals,
a supervised-learning based algorithm is developed to estimate
the decode matrix which can transform the AN-aided symbols
to the points with smallest distance to supervisory signals.
Finally, we adopt an offline phase shift operation for the
transformed signals, to remove the effect of phase-rotation
introduced from the estimation.
A. Derivation of Supervisory Signals
In practical wireless systems, each packet includes not only
the data payload, but also preamble and physical layer header.
Unlike the data part which is different in each packet, the
format and information of the preamble and header is fixed
or within a limited choice when using a specific standard. For
example, for Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) packet in
IEEE 802.11ac [16], the modulation schemes are indicated in
SIG-A part of the header, and can only be chosen from either
BPSK, QPSK, 16QAM, 64QAM, or 256QAM. Therefore,
applying AN to the preamble part which includes a lot of
known information does not make sense, because it not only
consumes the precious transmission power but also benefits
Eve by providing known information and its cipher-text for
known-plaintext attack [13], [14].
With the above practical considerations, we can derive
the supervisory signals from the information of modulation
schemes, for our supervised-learning algorithm. For simplicity,
Bob is considered to have a single antenna (NB = 1).
Assuming U = [u1, u2, ..., um] as the signal set of modulation,
where m is the total number of signals corresponding to
Fig. 2. Transformed AN-aided QPSK signals.
the constellation points. Alice maps its information bits to a
symbol in U and generates AN-aided signals as shown in (2).
As described in (2) and (4), the information vector is expanded
by artificial noise to a vector of dimension NA at Alice, and
received by Eve as a NE dimension vector.
Since Eve does not know the wireless channel between
Alice and Bob, it has to try to estimate a decode matrix w to
transform the AN-aided signal vector y back to the transmitted
information bits as
wHy = b, (7)
where w ∈ CNE×1 is the normal vector and b is the
transformed signal. Therefore, as shown in Fig. 2, when a
vector wH = HG† is found by estimation and Eve’s SNR is
high enough (the noise power is ignorable), AN vector can
be completely canceled and the AN-aided signals y will be
transformed to either of the signal in U .
The modulation signals in U can then be used as the
supervisory signals to construct training data with the inputs
of AN-aided signals, for our supervised-learning algorithm.
We have to point out that even in the worst scenarios to Eve,
when Alice applies the AN-transmissions to the preamble part
regardless of the risk of known-plaintext attack, our algorithm
can still work well. Eve can simply apply our algorithm
to all possible modulation schemes and identify the correct
modulation schemes by comparisons, because only the results
of the correct scheme will have the optimal value for the object
function of the algorithm and can obtain the correct results
with Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). The operations with
different modulation schemes only introduce a linear increase
in complexity which can be neglected for Eve.
B. Supervised-Learning Algorithm
In order to find a matrix w to decode the AN-aided
signals, we set the following object function J(w, δ) for the
supervised-learning algorithm, defined as
J(w, δ) =
k∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
δijdij , (8)
where k (0 < k ≤ Ns) is the number of sample symbols for
learning and Ns is the total number of symbols in the packet.
dij is the distance between the ith transformed sample symbol
to the jth modulation signal, which is calculated as
dij = ||wHyi − uj ||2. (9)
δ ∈ Bk×m and its element δij is the indicator of dij which
can be calculated as
δij =
{
1, dij = min(di1, ..., dim)
0, else
(10)
which means only the distance between the ith transformed
symbol and its nearest modulation signal is counted.
We then adopt a supervised-learning algorithm to search
for the decode matrix w which can minimize the J(w, δ), as
shown in Algorithm 1. N in Step 1 is the maximum number
of iterative calculation before terminating the algorithm. Td
in Step 2 is the threshold of distance for J(w, δ) to prevent
the algorithm from converging to the local optimal value. Td
is calculated by Td = kασ2E , where α is the margin factor
considering the variance of noise power. c in Step 4 is the
threshold to check if w(n) has been changed from previous
value. Here we use the iterative calculation in our algorithm
because the derivative of Boolean-valued function δij to w
is difficult to be derived directly. The details of derivative
calculation in Step 3 is presented in the Appendix.
After the convergence of the algorithm, we demodulated the
constellation point for each symbol to uj where the index j
is calculated by argmin
j=1,...,m
||wHyi − uj ||, and thus decode each
symbol to its information bits.
C. Offline Phase Shifting
After searching for the decode matrix and demodulation, an
offline phase shifting operation is adopted to remove the effect
of phase rotation which may be introduced in the supervised-
learning algorithm. Phase rotation is an inherent problem in
blind estimation without channel information [17]. When the
modulation methods adopt phase values of constellation points
to express different information bits (such as that in PSK
and QAM), the phase rotation in estimation will cause a
100% Symbol Error Rate (SER) at the receiver. Taking BPSK
modulation as an example and omit the noise in Eve, both
the decode matrix wH = HG† and (w′)H = e−jpiHG† will
achieve the same minimum value of the target function in (8).
However, the latter one will cause a 180 degrees phase rotation
thus all symbols of bit 1 will be demodulated as 0, and vice
versa, which results in a 100% SER. Since the initial value
of w is random and Eve has no pre-knowledge of the channel
H and G, the probability of converging to w and w′ is equal,
which will result in a 50% Packet Error Rate (PER) for BPSK
even when there is no artificial noise.
As shown in Algorithm 2, an offline phase shifting operation
is designed for all symbols in the decoded packets to remove
the effect of phase rotation. CRC=1 indicates that the packet
has passed the CRC check, which means all bits in the packet
are the same as those transmitted from Alice. Np is the number
of candidate phases in the modulation signals (e.g. Np = 4 in
QPSK). We adopt a phase shift function f(2pi/Np, bj), which
converts the bit information in the jth symbol, bj , to the shifted
ones. The output of phase shift function has fixed values for
a certain modulation schemes, e.g. for QPSK f(pi/2, 00)=01,
Algorithm 1 Supervised learning algorithm
1: Initialization:
2: (1) Set n = 0 as the calculation number
3: (2) Set c1 = 0 and c2 = 0 as convergence indicators
4: (3) Generate initial w(n) randomly and normalize as
w(n) = w(n)/||w(n)||
5: Step 1:
6: if n > N then
7: w = w(n) and terminate the algorithm
8: else
9: Calculate dij and δij from (9) and (10)
10: Calculate J(w, δ) from (8), increase n = n+ 1
11: end if
12: Step 2:
13: if J(w, δ) < Td then
14: c1 = 1
15: end if
16: Step 3: Re-calculate w(n) to minimize J(w, δ) by
∂J(w, δ)
∂w
= 0
and get w(n) as
w(n) =
(
k∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
δijyiy
H
i
)−1(
−
k∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
δijb
∗
jyi
)
,
17: Step 4:
18: if ||w(n)− w(n− 1)|| < c then
19: c2 = 1
20: else
21: Return to Step 1
22: end if
23: Step 5: Convergence check
24: if (c1 == 1 and c2 == 1) then
25: w = w(n) and terminate the algorithm
26: else
27: Start from Initialization (2)
28: end if
f(pi/2, 01)=11, f(pi/2, 11)=10 and f(pi/2, 10)=00. The above
phase shifting is performed until the correct phase which
leads to the correct CRC. This operation may increase the
computational complexity to a maximum of Np times, which
is an affordable linear increase to Eve, and results in a much
higher success probability of attack.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Simulation Parameters
This section presented various simulation results to evaluate
the performance of our proposed method, in comparison to
those of the conventional one proposed in [15].
We set NA = NE = 4 and NB = 1. A block fading channel
was assumed where the channel gains remain the same during
the transmission of one packet. Channel matrix G and H were
generated randomly for each packet, and the performance of
the attack method is evaluated using the average value of
one thousand packets. Each packet included 100 modulated
Algorithm 2 Phase shifting algorithm
1: if CRC = 1 then
2: Terminate
3: else
4: for i← 1, Np − 1 do
5: for j ← 1, Ns do
6: bj = f(
2pi
Np
, bj)
7: end for
8: if CRC = 1 then
9: Terminate
10: end if
11: end for
12: end if
symbols. We set N = 1000, c = 10−6 and α = 10 for the
searching algorithm in Algorithm 1. The signal power was
normalized and the SNR was defined as 1/σ2E . A packet would
be received correctly only when all symbols in the packet were
demodulated correctly.
B. Numerical Results
Fig. 3 compares the success probability of attack between
the proposed method and the conventional clustering method,
represented by dash and solid lines, respectively. The informa-
tion bits were transmitted using the QPSK modulation. SNR
in Eve was 40 dB and the number of sample symbols k was
50. Success probability of attack is calculated as (1 - PER)
of received packets in Eve. For the fair comparisons, we also
show the results when conventional method applies the offline
phase shifting. As shown in Fig. 3, our proposed method
largely improves success probability of attack compared to the
conventional one, from 4.8% to 95.8% in Pr=0.1, and from
4.3% to 72.2% in Pr=0.5, which is usually considered as the
optimal power ratio of AN [8].
We also show the comparison of the proposed method and
the conventional one with different modulation schemes in
Fig. 4. From the results in Figs. 3 and 4, we can see that when
Eve adopts our attack method, the AN transmission with low
order modulation such as BPSK and QPSK can be cracked in a
high probability. This means AN fails to keep its independence
to the Eve’s channel status, and the transmission to the receiver
in the cell-edge with low order modulation will be cracked
if the Eve’s channel is good enough. Therefore, in order
to guarantee secure communication, the transmitter needs to
increase artificial noise power as well as adopting higher
order modulation for the information vector. This will largely
decrease the coverage area compared to the traditional wireless
services which do not consider security in physical layer, thus
become an essential problem towards AN’s realization.
Fig. 5 shows the dependence on the number of Eve’s
antennas. One can see that increasing the number of Eve’s
antennas causes degradation in conventional method’s attack
performance. This is probably because the increase in NE
also increases the dimensions of received signals, which in
turn increases the probability of achieving the local optimal
values in conventional clustering method, thus fails to find the
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decode matrix. While in our proposed method, the increase in
NE results in an improvement of success probability of attack.
It indicates our proposed method can utilize the resource in
Eve more efficiently thus achieve higher attack performance.
The results with different number of sample symbols k
are shown in Fig. 6. Our proposed method outperforms the
conventional one on all accounts. Since the performances
of both the proposed method and the conventional method
show dependence on the number of sample symbols, which
can be considered as an inherent nature of machine learning
algorithm, AN transmission can only provide secure commu-
nication under certain conditions if the transmitted packet is
sufficiently short.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a machine learning-based attack
method against AN-aided transmissions. Our method utilizes
the modulation scheme information from the packet preamble
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Fig. 6. Success probability of attack with different number of sample symbols.
and header to build the supervisory signals, with which a
supervised-learning algorithm is developed for eavesdropper
to estimate the channel between transmitter and receiver for
decoding the AN-aided packets, followed by a phase shift
operation to remove the effect of phase rotation. Numerous
simulation results show that our method can improve success
probability of attack from 4.8% to at most 95.8% for QPSK
modulation. This implies that if the eavesdropper adopts our
attack method, AN transmission fails to keep its independence
to the eavesdropper’s channel status, and the transmission to
the receiver in the cell-edge with low order modulation will be
cracked if the eavesdropper employs more antennas than the
transmitter. Our attack method can bring a fresh view on the
evaluation of AN schemes and motivate researchers to design
more robust PLS approaches. Our future work will conduct
experimental evaluation of the proposed attack method. We
also intend to develop a novel AN scheme which is robust
against the machine learning attacks.
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APPENDIX
The detailed expression of the ∂J(w,δ)∂w in Step 3 of our
Algorithm 1 is given as
∂J(w, δ)
∂w
=
∑k
i=1
∑m
j=1 ∂(δijdij)
∂w
. (11)
As δij is a Boolean-valued function which depends on the
comparison between different dij , it is difficult to directly
derive its derivative to w. Therefore, we consider it to be a
constant number to w so as to simplify the (11) using only
∂dij
∂w , which can be calculated as
∂dij
∂w
=
∂(Tr{(wHy + bj)H(wHy + bj)})
∂w
=
∂(Tr{yHwwHw})
∂w
+
∂(Tr{yHwbj})
∂w
+
∂(Tr{bHj wHy})
∂w
+
∂(Tr{bHj bj})
∂w
=(yyH)Tw∗ + (bjy
H)T + 0 + 0. (12)
With (11) and (12), we can calculate ∂J(w,δ)∂w = 0 as follows:
k∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
δij(yy
H)Tw∗ +
k∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
δij(bjy
H)T = 0. (13)
By moving the second term in (13) to the right side of the
equation and performing conjugate operation on both sides,
we can derive w which can minimize the J(w, δ) as
w(n) =
(
k∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
δijyiy
H
i
)−1(
−
k∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
δijb
∗
jyi
)
, (14)
which is the expression shown in Step 3 of the Algorithm 1.
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